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Building and operating  transboundary environmental facilities  requires dividing the cost of 
pollution prevention between bordering states. When cost-burden questions arise, the solution often 
suggested is the “polluter pays principle” (PPP). However, when political and economic relations 
between neighboring countries are asymmetrical  other cost-burden principles are often adopted. 
Given the discrepancy between theory and practice, the aim of this study is to identify some of the 
available cost-burden principles and to examine when they  might replace the PPP. The pollution-
prevention regime along the San Diego/Tijuana border, and its cost-burden evolution, over the 20
th 
century is offered as a case study. It was found that under asymmetrical relations there are several 
competing cost-burden principles that include the polluter pays, the beneficiary pays and the ability 
to pay. In addition, there are mixed systems that combine these principles. Some principles are 
adopted since they are perceived, by some, to be fair while others are adopted since they are 
perceived to provide effective wastewater treatment. The ones that are likely to be effective are 
those that offset, to some degree, existing asymmetries. This explains why the PPP was replaced in 
the San Diego/Tijuana case with other cost-burden principles that better offset the asymmetries in 
power, willingness and ability  to pay for wastewater treatment and operational capacities. Thus, 
they  provided  better wastewater treatment  than  the  PPP.  It  is not  sufficient  for a cost-burden 
principle to be fair and  politically  feasible; it also has to offset, at least in part, existing 
asymmetries. Otherwise the regime set will not be environmentally viable.  
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1.  Introduction 
An important element in the management of wastewater infrastructure is the manner in  which 
wastewater facilities are funded. Lack of financial resources has often resulted in the inability to 
build wastewater plants (World Health Organization, 2004; United Nations, 2004). Even in cases 
where a pollution regime has been established, wastewater treatment facilities m ay not function 
adequately due to lack of funds needed to properly operate and maintain the facility (Sanchez, 
1995). The funding of such facilities is especially challenging when wastewater infrastructure is 
required to treat transboundary effluents. Funding in these cases requires dividing the cost between 
the countries that are responsible for the pollution problem and those adversely affected by it.  
 
When the cost-sharing question arises, the solution often suggested is the “polluter pays principle” 
(PPP) (Tobey and Smets, 1996; Atkinson, 2000; Franck, 1995; Nash, 2000; Hird, 1993). Indeed, 
many international organizations  have endorsed the PPP. Among them is the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development  (hereafter OECD  2002), the European  Union
1 and 
NAFTA ( Fernandez, 2004; Tobey and Smets, 1996).  The PPP has also been incorporated in a 
number of international agreements
2 and mentioned in several protocols and programs, such as the 
1992 Rio de Janeiro Declaration (1992), Agenda 21  and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
Development Implementation Plan (OECD, 2002). 
 
However,  an  examination of  transboundary  wastewater pollution regimes, including successful 
ones, reveals that, in fact, cost-sharing arrangements other than PPP are often adopted instead. And 
even when the PPP is applied, the ability of the regime to adequately resolve the pollution problem 
is unclear. This is especially so when dramatic political and economic asymmetries exist between 
the countries involved. Such was the case of the  negotiations over  regulating  the Rhine  River 
pollution during the 60-70s that had to confront asymmetries in the willingness to pay for pollution 
control between Germany and France, the upstream riparians, and their downstream neighbor, the 
Netherlands. The Netherlands' adherence to the PPP resulted in decades of negotiation deadlock. 
                                                 
1 The PPP is one of the basic principles of the EU environmental policy (Martin, 1994). In addition, the EU recently 
approved the Environmental Liability Directive that is based on the PPP.  
2 For example, the Convention of the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, the Convention of 
on the Protection of the Alps  and the Protocol on Water and Health.   3 
An agreement was reached only when an alternate cost-sharing formula was identified and adopted 
(Bernauer, 1995).  
 
Given the discrepancy between theory and practice, the aim of this study is to identify  some 
available cost-burden principles and  to examine  when they  might  replace the PPP.  The paper 
hypothesis that  implementing the PPP often  ignores the asymmetries  between the countries 
involved in power, their willingness and ability to pay for wastewater treatment and asymmetries in 
operational capacities. As a result, the PPP's ability to provide adequate wastewater treatment is 
hampered. In response, neighboring countries sometimes supplement or replace the PPP with other 
cost-burden arrangements that help to offset the existing asymmetries, thereby  creating  a more 
politically feasible and environmentally effective pollution control regime. Among these alternative 
principles are " the beneficiary pays the difference" and " equal division of the cost burden" of 
wastewater treatment.  
 
To examine the hypothesis the study focuses on the cost-sharing evolution, and its underlying 
reasons, of the pollution  abaitment regime along the twin border cities, Tijuana and San Diego. 
Interviews were conducted with the key players involved in the case history and the contemporary 
attempts to regulate the pollution along this border are also examined. In addition, many primary 
historical documents were reviewed  over a period of fourth years, including the negotiations 
transcripts, as they appear in the US Congressional Records and in the personal files of Manuel 
Ybarra, the retired Secretary of the US section of the International Boundary and Water 
Commission (IBWC).  
  
The difficulties and the partial success  in stopping Tijuana from polluting the river  have been 
studied from various perspectives. Among them is the influence of the boundary on the willingness 
of Mexico and the US to act (Kelly, 1994); the effect of interests, linkages and uncertainties on the 
regime formation and effectiveness (Marty, 2001; Salazar. 1999); and the role of place and scale in 
the Tijuana/San Diego boundary water quality process (Michel, 2000; Brown, 1998). In addition, 
several studies address the US/Mexico border innovations, including the new financing boundary 
institutions and their shortcomings (Mumme and Nalven, 1988; Mumme and More, 1999; Carter 
1999; Killgore and Eaton, 1995). However, the evolution of the choice of the cost-burden principles 
and their underlying reasons have been largely overlooked. In particular, the extent to which the   4 
cost-burden principles were used to offset the asymmetrical relations between the US and Mexico 
and its impact on the effectiveness of pollution control regime have not yet been explored. Such a 
study  will provide policy makers  with  tradeoff  options  when  seeking  effective  cost-burden 
arrangements for controlling transboundary wastewater pollution. 
 
The paper begins with a brief review of the potential barriers to adopting the PPP. Section two 
discusses the Tijuana/San Diego case study itself. It outlines the existing border asymmetries, then 
it shows how the adoption of a regime based on the PPP ignored many of these asymmetries, as 
well as its adverse implications. Finally, it explores the replacement of the PPP with other options. 
Section three identifies and discusses the range of choices for cost-burden principles, their effect on 
asymmetries and their underlying reasons. The final section explores the relationship between the 
specifics of this case and general features of policy reforms.  
 
 
2. The barriers to adopting the PPP 
The PPP is a normative doctrine, which means that the polluter should be the one to bear the cost of 
measures to prevent and control pollution. The PPP is assumed to provide economic effectiveness 
and environmental sustainability by internalizing the entire costs of production and consumption 
into markets prices. Thereby, the PPP both reduces distortions in the process of products entering 
into international and internalize environmental externalities (OECD, 2002, Rio Declaration, 1992). 
The PPP was also presented in the last decade as the equitable and fair way for appropriating the 
cost of pollution abatement (Franck, 1995; Nash, 2000; McLoughlin and Bellinger, 1993).  
 
Yet, the PPP was found to be difficult to implement; this failing  was often attributed to the political 
process. For example, Tobey and Smets, 1996, while studying agricultural subsidies in the European 
Union (EU), noticed that the existing institutional arrangements,  which in industrial countries 
endow agricultural producers with the right to pollute, complicate the applicability of the PPP to 
agriculture. Thus, the result i s a 'weak' PPP, which often  requires  the government  to pay for 
pollution prevention beyond what is consistent with this principle. Several factors were identified as 
contributing to the political process of not implementing the PPP. Among them is the difficulty to 
prove specific injury and causality (Franck, 1995), especially in dealing with non-point pollution 
sources and the strong agricultural lobby. For example, Seymour et al. (1992), in their study on the   5 
PPP's applicability to nitrate pollution in water in the UK, highlight the uncertainty concerning the 
causes of nitrate leaching that restricts the adoption of the PPP.  
 
Others have stressed the legal ambiguity of the PPP that complicates its applicability. Aickin (1987) 
pointed out that the lack of legal clarity over how much, for what and when the polluter should pay 
has complicated the implementation of the  theory of enterprise liability under which the 
manufacturer should provide safe products, or else pay  for the cost of injury to the consumers. 
Another  example is the  discord  over the interpretation of the P PP with respect to the use of 
environmental subsidies in different economic sectors, which raised the need for developing an 
alternative principle that would be accepted by all sides (Stevens, 1994). In addition, disputes may 
arise concerning the appropriate process to be used to determine how the polluter should pay, i.e., 
through compensation, pollution prevention, etc. Indeed, many oppose the PPP interpretation that 
allows the polluter to pay  (as long as he compensates the victim) because it disregards  future 
generations (Franck, 1995).  
 
Inspired from Rawls theory of justice and fairness (Rawls, 1958, 1971), another perspective for why 
PPP is not adopted  is rooted in the debate of  what cost-burden principle is fair and equitable 
(Bromley, 1997; McLoughlin and Bellinger, 1993). The PPP may allow us to use the resource most 
efficiently, but may also result in an inequitable distribution of the cost burden. Thus, their will be a 
need to chose a principle among a variety of fairness principles (some based upon equality, 
proportionality and even impartial criteria) that brings distributive justice. Indeed, Rose et al. (1998) 
in their study on rules for distributing tradable carbon dioxide emission permits outlined several 
competing cost-burden equity criteria (in addition to the PPP), some based on welfare economics or 
inherent rights and others on fairness of the process or its outcome. Hence, in the environment area 
often a compromise is struck between the PPP and differentiations principles such as ability to pay 
(Loefstedt, 1993).  Yet, it seems that determining which of the principles is equitable and fair is not 
clear-cut since equity is often a function of who the recipients of justice are (Dobson, 1998). Thus, 
the outcome may be fair to a group of parties within a local or issue-specific context but unjust from 
a broader perspective (Albin, 2002).   
 
Many experts have stressed that the reasons for the difficulty in implementing the PPP are keenly 
exacerbated when agreement for the cost allocation has to extend across international boundaries.   6 
This is the case when dividing the cost of  all  global problems, be it climate change, ozone layer 
depletion, endangered species, or transboundary problems, such as acid rain and river pollution. 
This difficulty is rooted in the lack of  relevant international laws and a central authority that can 
identify the polluter or mandate  enforcement  (Knox, 2002;  Kettlewell, 1992), as well as  a 
disagreement on property rights that state who has the right to pollute and who is entitled to a clean 
natural resource (McKean, 1996; Barrett, 1996). Thus, the outcome is likely to be bargaining over 
competing principles for the cost burden (Franck, 1995). 
  
When  the relations  between neighboring countries are asymmetrical  the  bargaining  over  the 
competing cost-burden principles is especially complex (Carraro, 1997, p. 1-8; Kettlewell, 1992). It 
was already found that  when there is  a strong power  asymmetry  between nations, principles 
pertaining to justice or the existing international law  are meaningless. This has been the case of the 
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over water appropriation (Kinarti, 1999 in Albin,2001). Thus, the 
outcome in many cases is a deadlock in negotiations. 
 
The next sections demonstrate that in this  study  it is  not political feasibility,  legal  clarity or 
economic fairness that hinders the use of the PPP. Rather it is the inability of the PPP to address the 
existing asymmetrical between nations that may result in ineffective pollution regime. It is to this 
end that the cost-sharing evolution of the pollution prevention regime along the San Diego/Tijuana 
border is analyzed. 
 
 
3. The San Diego/Tijuana cost-burden evolution                                                                                    
3.1 The San Diego/Tijuana case and its asymmetries  
The San Diego/Tijuana border, dividing the developed and the developing worlds, exhibits several 
obvious asymmetries. The Tijuana River, which is 17 miles long and  the basin is 1668 square miles 
in size, originates in Mexico about 11 miles southwest of the city of Tijuana. From there it flows 
northward through the city and subsequently crosses the US/Mexico boundary. In the US it flows 
for 5 miles before emptying into the Pacific Ocean (fig 1). This upstream-downstream geographical 
relation  enables Tijuana to pollute the river without b earing  the  consequences of pollution. 
Furthermore,  Mexican environmental policy has been traditionally overridden by development 
objectives. On the US side of the border, environmental regulation is not so closely pegged to   7 
development policy.  These differences in policy emphasis resulted in Mexican water quality 
standards that, until revised in 1988, were considerably lower than its neighbor's (Mumme and 
Nalven 1988). These factors set an asymmetrical willingness to pay for pollution control; it was 
often the US, needless to say, that  sought  transboundary pollution  abatement  (Integrated 
Environmental Plan, 1991).  
 
Another dimension of asymmetries is in the ability of both sides to pay for pollution control. The 
Mexican federal government traditionally has not prioritized financial allocations for solving the 
border pollution, and Tijuana's pollution  in particular (Ybarra, 2004). In  addition, the Mexican 
distribution  of funds is often a response to political and economic events  which are largely 
unrelated to local needs (Ingram et al, 1995 in Carter, 1999). Mexico's overall ability, in fact, to 
raise revenues via state taxes and to collect user fees is very limited (Carter, 1999). In contrast, in 
the US the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) established several grants programs
3 in order 
to  financially support US states' efforts to build wastewater plants (Melcer and Darche, 1993). 
These factors, coupled with the general striking economic disparity between both nations, creates an 
asymmetry in the ability to pay for pollution control along the entire border (Kantor, 1993). 
 
Other  asymmetries  relate  to operational capacities  to  stop pollution.  The Mexican wastewater 
treatment operation and maintenance practices are limited compare to those in the US (Friedkin, 
1986). Between 1963-1986 the Mexican wastewater treatment works  in Tijuana experienced 33 
breakdowns (Friedkin, 1986).  Many of these occurred because of Mexico's limited ability to 
enforce its environmental laws, regulations and plans,  from  pretreatment through the entire 
treatment process.  
 
Finally, there is the striking power asymmetry between the two nations that can be reflected in the 
military, economic and diplomatic superiority of the US over Mexico.  
 
Table 1 shows the different pollution control asymmetries between Tijuana and San Diego and their 
indicators. 
 
                                                 
3 The EPA's construction grants program is the prime source of capital for wastewater treatment facilities. It was 




Indicators  San Diego  Tijuana 
Location  Downstream  Upstream  Willingness to pay 
  Water quality 
standards 
High  Low 
User fee collection  High  Low  Ability to pay  
Economic capacities  High  Low 
Availability of 
technology  
High  Low  Operational capacities  






Power balance   Military, economic 
and political power 
High  Low 
Table 1: Pollution control asymmetries between San Diego and Tijuana 
 
 
Next,  the cost-burden evolution  of the wastewater treatment initiatives between  San Diego and 
Tijuana is presented. In particular, the adoption of the PPP, its failure to  provide  effective 
wastewater treatment through offsetting the existing asymmetries and its replacement with other 
principles that better address the asymmetries are outlined.   9 
 
   10 
3.2 Early cost-sharing regime 
The first municipal wastewater system was a septic tank constructed in Tijuana in 1928 with a 
capacity to serve 500 inhabitants. Already in 1933 the system was overloaded, so the city expanded 
the facility to treat a population of 5000 (Meyer, 1983). Within a short while the system was again 
overloaded, and  sewage b ecame a problem in the Lower Tijuana River Valley (Marty 2001), 
fouling  the stream and groundwater.  Complaints flowed in  from the US side of the border 
(Duemling, 1980). As a response to pressure from San Diego on the US federal officials a system 
that collected the partially treated sewage from the Mexican side of the border to its outfall in the 
US was constructed – fig 1, phase 1 (Kelly, 1994, p. 168). Most of the outfall capacity was for the 
16,000 people now living in the city of Tijuana. The portion of the collection system within Mexico 
was funded by the Mexican Northern Territory of Baja California while the outfall and the other 
part of the project within the US were paid by the US Federal Public Works Administration (Kelly, 
1994, p 176). This construction cost was divided on the basis of the expected benefits to the US and 
its superior ability to pay (Ybarra, 2004). Since Mexico had an interest in addressing the power 
asymmetry between both sides by being seen as an equal partner to the US, the Territory of Baja 
California and the County of San Diego shared equally the costs of the wastewater plant operation 
and maintenance (Ybarra, 2004).  
 
After the first wastewater facility was built, in 1945 the US and Mexico signed a water treaty (1944 
Treaty) and established the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), comprised of a 
Mexican and an  American section. The Treaty included the so-called “minute” mechanism as a 
means for the two nations to agree to clarify or supplement the treaty to solve an issue, establish a 
policy, or authorize a capital project (Eaton, 1992). The treaty obliged the two governments to find 
solutions to the border sanitation problems and gave the IBWC the authority to meet this obligation 
(1944 Treaty, article, 2, 3, 24). Yet, the treaty did not set guidelines for how to achieve this goal 
financially and how to divide its cost.  
 
3.3 Leveraging a PPP regime 
Two decades after the early regime was established, and as the population of Tijuana significantly 
grew,  the quantities of sewage  increasingly overloaded  the existing US outfall  (Marty, 2001; 
Meyer, 1983). Mexico rejected a US suggestion to build one integrated system in the US where the 
cost  would be shared according to the PPP. Instead, it preferred a unilateral solution that was   11 
cheaper (Graves, 1985 . As a result, in 1958 San Diego built its own wastewater facility in Point 
Loma and Mexico built two pumping stations that shifted the raw sewage west, along a bypass 
route, to the Pacific Ocean at a point several miles south of the international border  phase.2, fig 1 
(Marty, 2001). Because of operational problems the Mexican facility was often not functioning 
(Minute, 270). And because Mexico ran out of funds the pipe was not completed and the water was 
discharged down a little gully without any treatment (Delaney, 1984). As a result of Mexico's 
inability to operate its wastewater facility in 1965 both governments signed a 20-year agreement 
(Minute 222) that established an emergency connection of  Tijuana's sewage system to the San 
Diego metropolitan sewage system- phase 3. fig 1. Mexico agreed to fund and built the pipeline on 
its side, but since it claimed that it could not pay the true cost of treatment in the US, it was agreed 
that payment for the use of San Diego facility  would be set at a fixed rate, regardless of the 
expected escalation cost (Frauenfelder, 2004). The difference was to be paid by the US section of 
the IBWC. 
 
However, during the 1970s and early '80s the wastewater facility in Tijuana and the Mexican 
bypass system both broke down and the emergency connection reached its capacity limits (Graves, 
1985). This  led to several miles of San Diego beaches being placed  under quarantine (Graves, 
1985) and hampered the US attempts to recover the Tijuana River Estuarine Sanctuary (Douglas, 
1984). The pollution problems were expected to exacerbate due to a further increase in Tijuana's 
sewage flow and  a shortage of Mexican funds to improve their existing wastewater systems or 
build a new one (Meyer, 1983). Despite the several environmental framework agreements
4 signed 
between both governments  in this period, a solution to the Tijuana pollution and a cost-sharing 
formula had to be found since all existing agreements had avoided the question of how the border 
costs would be divided (table 2).  
 
The solution suggested by the US during the 80s was to build an international water treatment plant 
(IWTP) and a deep ocean outfall that would carry the treated sewage of the IWTP out to sea. 
Taking into account the asymmetries in capacities to run the plant, it was proposed that it be built in 
the US and employ US technology and personnel. The plant was also to address the cities' different 
                                                 
4 Among them are the 1978 Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation on Environment Transboundary 
Environmental Problems and Programs; Minute 261, that assigned the IBWC to resolve the pollution problem, and the 
1983 La Paz Agreement for the Protection of the Environment.   12 
water quality standards by adopting secondary wastewater treatment, which in the US had become a 
requirement with the 1972 Clean Water Act. The cost of  the facility was estimated at  US$730 
million (Lowry and Associates, 1983). The US Congress expected Mexico to foot $390 million of 
the bill, to pay for its treatment expenses Deddeh, 1984). The US did not offer any financial help for 
the Mexican  participation  in the international facility  or for improving  its existing wastewater 
system (Reavis, 1984), thinking in terms off fairness and the PPP (Marty, 2001, p. 282).  
 
A cost-sharing formula, based upon the PPP, that ignored the difference in ability to pay during an 
economic crisis that saw a 50% unemployment rate was seen by the Mexican administration as 
unrealistic (Romero, 1984 in Mumme and Nalven, 1988). Furthermore, as Mexico was the upstream 
riparian, it  had  not prioritized the pollution problem  and this too contributed to the  two sides' 
differing perceptions of the relative importance of the sewage  issue (Eberhardt, 2004). Finally, 
Mexico was loath to support the international facility  because  it was the  higher  water quality 
standards of the US that it was expected to uphold (Saxod, 2004).  
 
Mexico thus stalled the negotiations for several years (Baumli, 1984, p. 32) and finally offered its 
own solution: it chose to implement the PPP through further development of its existing wastewater 
system. A unilateral PPP solution was cheaper for Mexico than a binational plant (Kelly, 1994.p. 
278). Moreover, it would contribute to the Mexican economy as federal money  would be spent 
domestically (Onorato, 1985) and it would serve national pride since Mexico would not be seen as 
a nation that receives foreign support (Ybarra, 2004). The authorities planned to convey Tijuana's 
effluents uphill, towards the south, apply primary treatment (the San Antonio plant) and then dump 
them into the ocean. In addition, Mexico also agreed to build a second sewage facility – the Rio 
Alamar plant – in return for US support of a Mexican loan from the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB)
5 for expanding the potable water supply in Tijuana (Metzner, undated).  
 
Given the Mexican willingness to solve the pollution problem the US has to accept this solution  
and, finally, in 1985 Minute 270 and Annex I to the La Paz agreement were signed. The former was 
a two-phase plans to build the coastal San Antonio  plant, the latter paved the way for construction 
of the inland Rio Alamar plant - phase 4 fig 1.  
                                                 
5 The IDB is an international organization that works to promote the economic and social development of Latin 
America.   13 
 
3.4 Living with the PPP  
In 1985 Mexico started building the San  Antonio plant, soon after the US complained that the 
coastal lagoon's location and shape were inappropriate for such a facility. In addition, during  that 
winter the three canyons west of Tijuana discharged wastewater  because of malfunctioning in 
Tijuana's collection system (McCann, 1986).  These problems  resulted in a bill introduced  by 
congressmen from San Diego allocating $37 million for defensive measures. The bill called for both 
catch basins to capture about 3mgd spills in four canyons, and a pumping station and a pipeline on 
the US side to carry sewage emanating  from the Tijuana River back to Mexico - phase 5 fig 1. 
(Lowry & Associates, 1983).  
 
However, it was quickly realized that the "return to sender" policy was not viable, that since as the 
existing and future Mexican facilities were not, and would not be in the foreseeable future, capable 
of treating the water the sewage sent would ultimately find its way back to the US (Fege, 2004). 
Consequently, this measure was deferred (Fege, 2004). Also, the planned Rio Alamar became a 
source of concern since Mexico was about to treat the wastewater with the same technology used on 
New River, which had proved a failure (Delaney, 1987). Even if the Rio Alamar plant would work 
Mexico refused to process the water beyond primary treatment since it viewed the US requirement 
for more stringent standards as a US domestic matter (Gunaji, 1988). Discharging primary treated 
effluents to the river would adversely affect the Tijuana River Estuary and US ocean  recreation 
activities (Delaney, 1988; Metzner, 1987). 
 
As suspected by the US,  just after the San Antonio facility was built it became clear that its 
conveyance system leaked, that the wastewater treatment level was inadequate and that its operation 
capacity was already insufficient to deal with the quantities of sewage being sent there. In addition, 
Mexico had made no progress on its pledge to implement an industrial pretreatment program to 
prevent the discharge of toxic wastes into the Tijuana's sewage system (Salazar, 1999). Because of 
these problems in 1987 the San Antonio plant was taken out of operation for a year and Mexico was 
informed by  the US that the second phase of the San Antonio plant would not go into effect 
(Manager's Report, 1988). As a result, untreated wastewater continued to flow into the Tijuana 
River (Metzner, 1987). These failings were viewed by many in the US as the ultimate proof of   14 
Mexico's incapacity to allocate the funds and find the technology required to solve the pollution 
problem (Wilson, 1984).  
 
3.5 Escaping the PPP 
Many of the Californian agencies were aware that the PPP could not offset the existing asymmetries 
between the two countries. Thus, there was a need to seek a new cost-burden  formula that could 
provide effective solutions, in the form of the IWTP (Delaney, 1984; Reavis, 1984). They wanted to 
divide the cost based on the relative economics and expected benefits of pollution control (Condit, 
1984.p. 37-8). This implied that Mexico would pay only a small fraction of the cost, if any. Yet, 
their solution was problematic since the US administration wanted a limit  for the US participation 
in the project (Ybarra, 2004; Frauenfelder, 2004). 
 
In order for the US to pay for the Mexican share of the project special congressional appropriation 
was required because facilities to treat wastewater from Mexico were not eligible for regular grants 
under existing federal or state laws (Obey, 1993). To overcome this obstacle, a coalition was built 
that incorporated four San Diego congressmen, the governor of California, the US section of the 
IBWC,  the m ayor of S an Diego and the EPA ( Gunaji, 2004). This coalition  already in 1984 
solicited the Appropriation Committee to allocate $50 million for the first phase of the international 
facility (Martinez, 1984, p. 65). Later, in 1988, H.R. 5269 was introduced in the House to provide 
federal funds for the construction of the plant ( Congressional Record, 1988).  Yet, the 
administration,  under President Ronald Reagan,  was willing to  contribute only  $32 million, 
matched by another $5 million in state funds, to start construction of the international facility – but 
this was contingent on Mexico paying a reasonable share for the cost of the treatment.  
 
The possibility of the US financing a facility in the US to treat wastewater from Tijuana became 
real in 1987 when the US passed the Clean Water Quality  Act, section 510 of which allows the 
IBWC US commissioner to seek a grant from the administrator of the EPA for the construction of 
an international plant to deal with the Tijuana problem. It implies that up to 55% of federal funds 
could be made available to the plant to process Tijuana sewage (Metzner, 1987). Consequently, and 
following  strong local pressure, in 1987 the US section of the IBWC resumed negotiations with 
Mexico on the basis of the IWTP proposal as the long-term solution (Marty, 2001, p. 275). 
   15 
US IBWC commissioner Narendra Gunaji realized that for Mexico to agree to the IWTP the cost-
sharing formula would need to incorporate the principle of the "beneficiary pays" and the "ability to 
pay"  while for the US congress to agree a principle under which the polluter pays some of the cost 
would be required (Gunaji, 2004). To reconcile these conflicting principles, Gunaji argued that the 
proposed  international  plant should be  in lieu of  Mexico's promised construction of the second 
phase of the San Antonio plant as well as a replacement for the promised Mexican treatment plant 
on the Rio Alamar River (Gunaji, 1988). Mexico's share would be at a cost equal to that which it 
would have spent on the building and operating of these two plants; in addition, the ocean outfall 
would be paid by the US federal government and San Diego (Gunaji, 1988). To help Mexico pay its 
share, the State Department suggested that  it should be given credit for many of its previous 
wastewater works (Aronson, 1990). 
 
Given  the strong local pressure to adopt a more flexible cost-sharing  formula,  the US 
administration, now headed by George Bush, in July 1989 agreed to support the federal funding for 
the IWTP in the fiscal years 1991 and 1992 (Silva, 2004). The US spending limit was set by 
Congress at $239 million (Balint, 1994). An important argument for the US paying the lion's share 
of the pollution treatment was the economic cost of sewage contamination (Marty, 2001); building 
the plant on the US side to ensure control over the wastewater treatment process (Saxod, 2004; 
Eberhardt, 2004) and the fact that the US funding  would go to US products and services  were 
additional factors. In addition, Mexico was to  handle and dispose of the plant's sewage sludge. 
(McCann, 1988).  
 
Subsequent to a meeting between both country's presidents on October, 3, 1989 construction of the 
IWTP was agreed upon and on July, 2 1990 Minute 283 was signed - phase 6, fig 1. The minute 
stipulated that Mexico would share in the construction, maintenance and operation of  the IWTP 
according to the principle of "the beneficiary pays the difference," meaning it would pay an amount 
equivalent to what it would have expended in the construction, maintenance and operation of stage 
II of the San Antonio plant and the construction of the Rio Alamar plant. In addition, Mexico was to 
be given credit for the sewage treatment works currently provided in Tijuana, covering part of its 
operating cost by supplying electrical energy for the plant. The land and the ocean outfall costs 
would be paid by the US.  
   16 
The construction of the IWTP was delayed for several years because of  the  inability to obtain 
information from Mexico on sewage content and flow rates (Perciasepe, 1994) and because of 
disagreements over the Mexican share in the project. It was finally completed in 1997, though the 
ocean outfall was only completed in 1999. The total cost of the plant swelled to $383 million, of 
which Mexico paid $16 million  (Perciasepe, 1994).  During construction loans w ere given to 
Mexico for its part of the contribution to the project, to be repaid upon its completion (Valenzuela, 
1994). Until the plant began operating more interim measures were needed to address the sewage 
problem (Filner, 1991). The option adopted was to treat the effluents from Mexico in the San Diego 
system by money provided by the US government (City Council of San Diego, 2002).  
 
4. The new border cost-burden regime 
To deal with the difficulty of financing the border pollution problems that in 1993 were estimated at 
somewhere between $5-12 billion (Audley, 1993), several bills were introduced to the US Congress 
in the early 1990s.
6 Their aim was to authorize the EPA to appropriate funds for the construction of 
wastewater treatment  without Mexico's c ontribution, on the basis of  the  US' economic  and 
operational comparative advantage (Bingaman, 1994) or on a case-by-case basis (House Resolution, 
1992).  Yet, none of them were enacted. In addition, the resources for "Integrated Border 
Environmental Plan,"
7 initiated in 1992, were not committed (Spalding, 2000). 
 
The turning point in financing the border pollution and offsetting the asymmetries was the 
negotiations over the North America Free Trade Agreement between Mexico, the US and Canada 
(NAFTA). During the negotiations many supported a new binational agency with its own funding 
mechanism to create a border cleanup fund. The fund was to be free of the appropriation constraints 
that were set in the Tijuana/San Diego case and with a capacity to bridge the striking economic 
asymmetries between Mexico and the US (Kantor, 1993). To achieve this, the US was to provide 
two-thirds of the bank capital, and accordingly expected to receive two-thirds of the voting rights 
on the Board of Executive Directors (House Congress Resolution, undated). However, fears that 
such a voting percentage might discourage Mexico to participate in the fund (Hinojosa, 1993) and 
that such a formula may be perceived as foreign help (Browne, 1996) resulted in a formula based 
upon equality,  whereby both sides  would contribute equally to the bank capital and thus were 
                                                 
6 Among them are amendments to the Water Pollution Control Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act. 
7 Mexico was to contribute at least $460 million and the US $379 million (Carter, 1999)   17 
equally represented. The equal division of cost was also assumed to give Mexico an incentive to 
sign up for the greater use of user charges that the polluter pays (Shafer, 1993). Indeed, in 1994 the 
North American Development Bank (NADBank) was established. Both nations have each 
committed $225 million "paid in capital" and  have pledged to back the NADBank with $1.275 
billion of "capable" capital.  A Border Environmental Cooperation Commission (BECC) was 
established to evaluate the feasibility, efficiency and effectiveness of proposed projects to the bank 
(Killgore and Eaton, 1995).  
 
Another turning point in financing the border pollution and offsetting the asymmetries was when 
the  EPA obtained in 1994  $400 million  for  the establishment of  a  Border  Environmental 
Infrastructure Fund (BEIF). The EPA wanted the majority of the money to be spent on projects in 
Mexico where the money is more urgently needed while not being seen as foreign aid, which might 
block Congress support of the program. Thus, the US called on Mexico's federal agencies to equally 
match the grants (Memorandum, undated) and required the projects that are located in Mexico to 
have a US-side benefit and to meet the US water quality standards (Eberhardt, 2004). The grant 
program was  authorized  in 1995 in  Minute  296.  The program was  launched  in 2000 as both 
countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding  that allocated the US funds for the project on 
both sides of the border while the Mexican funds were to be spent only on projects on  its side 
(Memorandum of Understanding, 2000). Also, it was agreed that the grant program would only 
finance up to 50% of the project. The rest of the money was to be provided by NADBank loans and 
would have to meet the BECC eligibility criteria (Memorandum of Understanding, 2000). In 1997 
the BEIF program became part of the NADBank's responsibilities. 
 
5. The Tijuana/San Diego cost burden today 
In 1995 the existing Mexican wastewater systems (agreed in Minute 270) became overloaded and 
the collection system  started leaking. As a response, the EPA, supported by several local 
organizations, suggested improving the San Antonio plant to provide secondary treatment what 
would reduce the quantity of raw sewage discharged to the sea that can travel north into US waters 
(Orrin, 1993). It also suggested building a parallel conveyance system as a back up to the Mexican 
system (Ybarra, 1997) and a connection from the IWTP to the conveyance system in Tijuana in 
order to return effluents intended for disposal in the ocean off Mexico during times that the ocean 
outfall under construction was not in operation (Minute 298, 1997).    18 
  
The US was willing to foot the $16 million bill for the conveyance system and $1.5 million for the 
connection from the IWTP to the conveyance system  from BEIF money  as long as the  figures 
would be matched by Mexico through rehabilitating their existing wastewater collection system 
(Wachtel, 2004).  Another condition was that the $2 million cost of upgrading the existing San 
Antonio plant and the costs of the conveyance system that exceed the $16 million would be paid by 
Baja Californian. A loan would be provided by NADBank to help Mexico participate in the project 
(Minute 298, article II). Besides the benefits to the US from a backup system, another advantage of 
financing the bulk of the project was the assumption that upgrading the San Antonio plant would 
replace the conveyance of Tijuana's sewage through the emergency connection.  Upgrading the 
Tijuana system and the parallel system were completed in late 2000 - phase 7 fig 1. Yet, Mexico 
was unwilling for a few years to accept responsibility for running the system, arguing that that 
implied increased expenses (Salazar, 1999). 
 
A recent ongoing problem  was the EPA and US section of the IBWC requirement of many local 
organizations and the state of California  to meet the Clean Water Act by achieving secondary 
standards for all sewage discharged from the IWTP by December 2000 (Manager's Report, 2002). 
The Congress and the US president responded to these demands in 2000 through the Tijuana Valley 
Estuary and Beach Sewage Cleanup Act  that  authorized $156 million for an  agreement with a 
private company in Mexico to provide the secondary treatment (Public  Law 106-457). Thus,  in 
2002 a minute was signed between both countries stipulating the possible agreement (Minute 311, 
2002). The decision to employ a private company was seen as a win-win solution: for Mexico it 
would provide reclaimed water (paid  for by the US) while not impinging upon  its sovereignty 
(Congressional Record, 1999)  and  the US  would benefit from  secondary treatment  which, 
nevertheless, would be of a higher quality than if  the wastes were treated by the Mexican 
government (Schlesinger, 2004). - phase 10 fig 1. However, because of disagreements between the 
US and Mexico concerning  the nationality of the private company a solution  has not  yet been 
agreed upon (Rascon, 2004).  
 
Finally, since many of Tijuana's neighborhoods were not hooked up to sewers even after the ITWP 
and the conveyance system were built sewage kept flowing to the US side. Consequently, a 
Congress bill (H. Con. Res. 331) was introduced to force Mexico by international law to share in   19 
the burdens caused by its sewage. But it was opposed since there was a fear that punitive action 
would  jeopardize many of the NADBank projects  in which  Mexico matches US funding 
(Rodriguez, 1998). Instead, the  Tijuana's collection system  is now being rehabilitated through  a 
BEIF $18.5 million grant, matched by Mexico, and a $6 million NADBabnk loan to Mexico (EPA, 
2002b) - phase 8 fig 1. In addition, a master plan is currently being developed for Tijuana's sewage 
treatment  (EPA, 2002a)  - phase 9, fig 1 .  The  EPA, in response to  a  congressional direction, 
contributed the majority of its cost ($2 million) and the rest was provided by a NADBank grant for 
implementing the feasibility study's findings. Mexico, in turn, dedicated staff and expertise from 
several agencies and provided the meeting facilities (Wachtel, 2005).  
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and Minute 304 
2000; 2002  Equal matching for 
projects in Mexico 
 
Table 2: Framework agreements, year of initiation and their cost-burden principle 
 
 
6. Discussion: Balancing fairness and effectiveness  
The study reveals that under conditions of asymmetry there are three major competing cost-burden 
principles: the polluter pays,  the beneficiary pays and the ability to pays.  It  is likely that each 
country will adopt the principle that best protects its interests dependent on their physical position 
in the basin in question. It was the US, as the rich and downstream state receiving the pollution, that   20 
advocated for the PPP while Mexico, as the poor and upstream state, advocated for the two other 
principles. In addition, there are also mixed systems that combine these principles. These are the 
"beneficiary pays the difference," "equal division of the cost burden" and a soft version of the PPP. 
 
These principles tend to replace each other along time. The current case began with the building of 
a septic tank, the cost of  whose construction was divided according to the respective benefits to 
Mexico and the US  and the latter's superior ability to pay (event 1a), although its operation was 
divided equally (event 1b). This cost-burden arrangement was replaced with the PPP as Mexico 
built and paid for its early wastewater system (event 2). Next, a soft version of the PPP was adopted 
as Mexico paid for the emergency connection pipeline and some of the operation and treatment 
costs (event 3). Twenty years later there was a retreat again back to the PPP as Mexico built and 
funded the entire cost of its own advanced wastewater facility (event 4). Again, the PPP was soon 
replaced with  US pays for the defensive measures (event 5) and with  "the beneficiary pays the 
difference" that financed the IWTP (event 6). Then it was the "equal division of the cost burden" 
(that guided the establishment of NADBank and BEIF) that built the Parallel Conveyance System 
and rehabilitated the Mexican collection system (events 7, 8). Finally, there is the Tijuana Master 
Plan and the proposed Bajaagua project, paid almost entirely by the US' EPA (event 9, 10). 
 
Fig 2 delineates the ten Tijuana/San Diego wastewater projects (events) according to their time of 
establishment and their cost-burden principle. On the one pole of the principles is the PPP and on 
the other is the ability to pay and beneficiary pays. Fig 2 reveals that there are three cycles in the 
choice of the cost burden:  in each cycle there is a shift from ability to pay and beneficiary pays 
principles towards the PPP and a retreat backwards. The current cycle (the third) fluctuates between 
the two poles less than the previous two cycles.  
 
The  cycles represent  the tension between effectiveness  in wastewater treatment  and  the US 
interoperation of fairness and the attempts to reconcile them. Both cases of implementing the PPP 
(events 2, 4) were driven by  the US putting their interpretation of fairness at the forefront of the 
negotiations. Mexico agreed to accept these solution based upon the PPP because of US political 
pressure, the financial linkages (that helped Mexico to pay) and the Mexican decision to implement 
the PPP unilaterally. Yet  the PPP, despite serving justice to the US administration, ignored the 
asymmetries between the US and Mexico in operational capacities, willingness and ability  to pay   21 
and power  (table 3). As a result,  as shown,  it provided  ineffective wastewater treatment.  In 
response, in the former case (event 2) the US replaced the PPP with the soft version of the PPP 
(event 3) and in the latter case (event 4) with the US pays for the defensive measures (event 5) and 
the "beneficiary pays the difference" principle (event 6). The soft version of the PPP allowed the 
wastewater to be treated according to US technological capabilities and standards, thus offsetting 
the asymmetry in operation. Yet,  it  ignored  the willingness of San Diego to pay for Tijuana's 
wastewater and the ability of Tijuana to pay for the expansion of the connection (table 3). As a 
result, the connection was terminated after 20 years. The "beneficiary pays the difference" principle 
addresses the power asymmetries since it did not depict Mexico as a country that receives foreign 
aid (Christensen, 2004). It also took  into account asymmetries in ability and willingness to pay 
since the formula considered Mexico's limited financial capacities while at the same time forcing 
Mexico to contribute and thereby satisfying the US administration's concern for that country's 
financial participation. Finally, it also addressed the asymmetries in capabilities since the US paying 
most of the cost allowed the plant to be built on the US side and use US technology (table 3). 
Addressing the asymmetries both contributed to the effectiveness of the solution and to its political 
feasibility. Given its success to offset asymmetries it is not surprising that this formula was adopted 
in  other cases, such as the Nogales  international  plant (Duemling, 1980) and the  Laredo/Nuevo 
Laredo case (Rascon , 2004).  
 
Lately it seems that the tension between effectiveness and fairness is reconciled by the adoption of 
the principle of  "equal division of costs" (events 7, 8) which means that parties receive identical 
burdens regardless of differences in needs, preferences or other considerations.  This  principle 
provides Mexico equal footing in NADBank and the BECC, thereby addressing their interpretation 
of fairness along with addressing  the asymmetry in power (table 3)  and thus providing both  a 
politically feasible and effective solution. The "equal division of cost" has also often adopted in 
other cases
8 and is perceived as an equitable and feasible mean for cost-sharing (Giordano, 2004). 
However, since this formula ignored the Mexican limited ability to pay already in 1995 Mexico did 
not transfer its $56 million share to the bank and nowadays finds it difficult to pay its 50% share in 
the BECC operation (Rascon, 2004). Furthermore, Mexico often does not have the money to match 
the US BEIF program and finds the NADBank market-based interest rates too high. To address 
these difficulties  the EPA  often enables  Mexico to  match  funds by crediting  it for its past 
                                                 
8 For example the United States and Canada divided the Salmon harvests equally in the Frazer River Convention.    22 
wastewater treatment (Eberhardt, 2004) and asks for the money back on a cumulative basis, though 
not necessarily for the same project or in a given year (Lehman, 2001).  
 
Another means to address Mexico's difficulty  in  paying is the Project Development Assistance 
Program (PDAP), which is a US funding program, established recently by the EPA, for wastewater 
treatment development  activities ( Carter, 1999).  The program does  not have the matching 
requirement, with the exception of design costs where the program is limited to a 50% of the total 
design cost, not to exceed $500,000 (Wachtel, 2005).  The Tijuana Master Plan  (event 9)  is an 
example for the ongoing trend of the US paying the majority cost of the crucial phases of the 
project (planning and design) to help Mexico overcome the matching requirement and to strike the 
balance of effectiveness versus justice in favor of effectiveness (Wachtel, 2004). The US paying the 
cost offsets Mexico's limited ability to pay, as well as its operational capacities, and allows the US 
to determine the technology used and the standards adopted. Yet, this ignores the willingness of the 
Congress to support such programs and the power asymmetry since it presents Mexico as a nation 
that receives foreign aid (table 3). 
 
Given the finding that a cost-burden principle that ignores asymmetries is not likely to provide 
effective wastewater treatment, it is not surprising why the border communities that directly receive 
the pollution prefer the alternatives to the PPP. This was the position of San Diego congressmen in 
the IWTP negotiations. It is also the current position of several NGOs for the need to reform the 
BEIF and NADBank in a manner that allows the US to spend more money in Mexico (e.g. Sierra 
Club, 1993, Texas Center for Policy Studies, 2001). Which principle they prefer depends on the 
asymmetries they prioritize t o  offset. For example,  to  offset  the  power asymmetry  equal 
contribution  may  be adopted while  to offset the operational capacities the beneficiary pays the 
difference or ability to pay is likely to be adopted. 
  
In the last decade a greater part of the cost has been allocated to the private sector in financing 
trans-border wastewater infrastructure.  The primary purpose of NADBank is to secure private 
investment ( Killgore and Eaton, 1995).  Also, in the r ecent case of  IWTP treated water the 
congressional direction was to seek an agreement with a private company in Mexico to provide the 
secondary treatment (event 10). The private sector, assumed to have a larger capacity to collect user 
fees and to operate  advanced technology, is perceived to have the ability to offset operational   23 
capacities as well as to address the ability to pay  asymmetry. Some even argue that  if private 
international entities would manage transboundary aquifers that may address the power asymmetry 
since the different parties sharing the aquifer will have to cooperate in order to get the best possible 
deal from the franchisee (Feitelson and Haddad 2001).  But their success is yet to be proven, 
especially since there is not a single case worldwide of an international private entity that manages 
a shared resource. 
     Table 3 summarizes the projects built, how they were formalized, their cost-burden principle and 
the effect of the principles on asymmetries.  
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Table 3: Projects built, their cost-burden principles and the effect of the principles on 
asymmetries  
“-“increase asymmetries 
 “+“offset asymmetries 
 
7. Conclusion 
Only a few of the studies on transboundary pollution make the effort to address the asymmetries 
between various countries sharing the boundary (Fernandez, 2002). This study, by incorporating the 
effect of asymmetries on the negotiation and implementation processes, has found that asymmetries 
resulted in competing cost-burden principles; some of these principles were perceived, by some, to   24 
be more fair while others were found more effective in building a pollution control regime. Those 
that are more environmentally effective are the ones that address the asymmetries. This is why, as 
hypothesized, the PPP was replaced with other principles that did address the asymmetries.  
 
Each of the principles that replaces the PPP  addresses the asymmetries differently.  In the 
Tijuana/San Diego  case,  "beneficiary pays" addresses the ability to pay and the operational 
asymmetries but ignores the US willingness to pay and Mexican power inferiority. "Equally paid," 
on the other hand, addresses the willingness to pay and Mexican power inferiority but ignores the 
asymmetries in ability to pay. The "beneficiary pays the difference" principle addresses many of the 
asymmetries but is criticized for not addressing the need to treat the water at the source of  the 
pollution at a lower cost (Michel, 2000).  
 
The finding that the different cost-burden  principles affect the asymmetries differently and thus 
correspond with fairness, effectiveness differently explains why there are cycles in the cost-burden 
formulas. The cycles represent projects whose funding was based upon US notions of fairness that 
were replaced by projects whose funding is based on notions of effectiveness. The replacement of 
the PPP with the other cost-burden principles is one example. It also shed light on why the current 
NADBank funding program and the BECC process contain conflicting cost-burden principles. This 
is since each component of the program tries to offset a different asymmetry. For example, while 
projects should be maintained through user fees paid by the polluters to help the polluter to pay 
(Carter, 1999) both nations  in order to address the power asymmetry  have been  paying for the 
project, nor just the upstream polluter (Fernandez, 2004). Finally, it also highlight why financing 
agreements are often packages since they are based not only on one but several criteria of justice.  
The adopting of the beneficiary pays the difference that capture both the PPP and the ability to pay 
principle is one example.     
 
The need to better address the asymmetries explains the recent establishment of PDAP and the 
restructuring of NADBank  that extended its  geographical scope and  grant component  (Press 
Release, 2004). Yet, there is a need for further study to identify which of the principles replacing 
the PPP is more effective. In other words, whether offsetting the power asymmetry by adopting the 
equally paid principle is more effective than offsetting the ability to pay by allowing the US to foot   25 
the  lion's share of the bill. In addition, the study findings concerning the effect of the various 
principles on the capacities asymmetries are inconclusive and, thus, should be explored further. 
 
Besides the tradeoffs between  fairness  and  effectiveness  several other tradeoffs were found. 
Tradeoffs exist between the different asymmetries, such as between ability to pay and the power 
asymmetry. One example of this tradeoff is the Mexican preference to offset the power asymmetry 
by equal representation in NADBank over the option of offsetting the ability to pay asymmetry by 
allowing the US to contribute the majority of capital to the bank. Another type of tradeoff found is 
between the cost-burden principle and the location of the project and the degree of cooperation in 
its implementation. Insisting on the PPP implied unilateral Mexican projects in Mexico. In contrast, 
allowing the US to pay the bulk of the cost allowed for joint projects to be conducted in the US.  
 
In conclusion, the study demonstrates that often the PPP is not adopted or replaced not because of 
its lack of legal clarity, political feasibility or fairness, but rather because of its inability to address 
the existing asymmetries and thus to provide environmentally effective pollution control. This study 
thus  stresses the need to  examine and analyze  the effect of  the cost-burden principles on  all 
economic and political asymmetries before determining and implementing any given regime.  
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